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Abstract
Economists are fond of the physicists’ powerful tools. As a popular mindset
Toolism is as old as economics but the transplants failed to produce the same
successes as in their aboriginal environment. Economists therefore looked
more and more to the math department for inspiration. Now the tide turns
again. The ongoing crisis discredits standard economics and offers the chance
for a comeback. Modern econophysics commands the most powerful tools
and argues that there are many occasions for their application. The present
paper argues that it is not a change of tools that is most urgently needed but a
paradigm change.
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1 Powerful tools
When Arnold Schwarzenegger, in his most popular roles, has seen and suffered
enough evil he makes up his mind and first of all breaks into a gun store. With the
eyes of an expert he spots the most suitable devices for the upcoming tasks. When
he leaves the store with maximum firepower and determination we can rely upon
that in the sequel humankind will be better off. This is how Hollywood reflects
and thereby reinforces a plausible, convenient, and impressive problem solving
strategy. Science seems to be the antithesis of Hollywood but in most cases the
modus operandi is not much different. In how many economic papers or books
have you read that, with this or that powerful tool, some urgent problem will now
be solved for good? In JSTOR you will find about 20,000 items. In the foreword of
their Recursive Macroeconomic Theory the authors use the word power four times
on one single page and advertise: ‘We aim to give readers a taste of the power of
the methods . . . ’ (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004, p. xix). Sounds as promising as
Arnold’s “I’ll be back.”
Let us call this popular mindset Toolism. Keynes, for example, has to be counted as
an old fashioned Toolist.
There is a role for historical generalisation, which relies on one of the
most important logical tools, pattern recognition (metaphor, analogy);
and a role for argument from first principles. (Keynes, quoted in Chick,
1998, p. 1860)
Debreu was an outspoken advocate of Toolism in the heydays of general equilibrium.
It [rigor] may also lead to a radical change of mathematical tools. In the
area under discussion it has been essentially a change from the calculus
to convexity and topological properties, a transformation has resulted
in notable gains in the generality and simplicity of the theory. (Debreu,
1959, p. x)
If there ever was a Toolist, then John von Neumann. In fact, he inspired the program
of modern econophysics.
You know, Oskar, if those books are unearthed sometime a few hundred
years hence, people will not believe they were written in our time.
Rather, they will think that they are about contemporary with Newton,
so primitive is their mathematics. Economics is simply still a million
miles away from the state in which an advanced science is, such as
physics. (quoted in Ingrao and Israel, 1990, p. 197), this anticipates
the curriculum of (McCauley, 2006, p. 20)
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Keynesianism and General Equilibrium Theory are now known to be failures.
Exactly for this reason the ‘present crisis might offer an excellent occasion for a
paradigm change.’ (Bouchaud, 2009, p. 2). Econophysics comes to the rescue with,
yes, a new tool.
Whereas the simple Curie-Weiss mean-field approximation for homoge-
nous systems is well known and accounts for interesting collective
effects, its heterogeneous counterpart is far subtler and has only been
worked out in detail in the last few years. It is a safe bet to predict
that this powerful analytical tool will find many natural application in
economics and social sciences in the years to come. (Bouchaud, 2009,
pp. 6-7)
It is an even safer bet that econophysics only kicks off the nth cycle of Toolist’s
promise and letdown. A change of tool is not a paradigm change and if you are on the
wrong track a faster car will bring you deeper into the woods. The development of
equilibrium economics from Jevons and Walras to DSGE was of this sort (Quiggin,
2010, pp. 80-136). Needless to emphasize that Jevons and Walras were Toolists.
Marginalism is calculus with a behavioral interpretation.
One wonders whether econophysicists have a sense of irony. What they criticize with
full justification about standard economics is exactly the product of econophysics
vintage 1844.
The backward state of the Moral Sciences can only be remedied by
applying to them the methods of Physical Science, duly extended and
generalized. (Mill, 2006, p. 833)
Original econophysics did not work as intended and it is of some importance for
new econophysics to find out why. The obvious drawbacks of Toolism are twofold.
First, a tool may work superbly in one environment but not at all in another, and
second, a tool is no better than its user, ‘and not all users are skilled’ (Clower, 1995,
p. 308). Economists have borrowed many powerful tools from physics (Mirowski,
1995) and experienced a roughly equal number of disappointments. Econophysics
vintage 2013 commands the most powerful tools ever but seems to be at loss where
to put them to work: ‘So where should one start?’ (Bouchaud, 2009, p. 2)
2 It’s not the tool, it’s the paradigm
Physics has its own experience with a stagnant research program but it seems that
the lesson has been forgotten. For two millenia physicists and mathematicians
worked on the geocentric theory, well aware of its conspicuous flaws, only to arrive
at a system that was ‘extremely ingenious and completely mad’ (Koestler, 1979, p.
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68). From the very beginning nothing stood in the way to the correct solution but
the scientists themselves.
One of the most instructive facts in scientific history is the pertinacity
with which the human mind clung to the belief that the heavenly bodies
must move in circles, or to be carried round by the revolution of spheres;
merely because those were in themselves the simplest suppositions . . .
(Mill, 2006, p. 756)
It was not a new and powerful tool that finally broke the deadlock. The four conic
sections were common knowledge since 300 BC. It was the idea of circular motion,
the premise of cosmology, that had to give way first. With it then vanished the
self-produced complexity of 55 epicycles.
. . . Kepler qualified his own achievement as cleansing of the Augean
stables. (Koestler, 1979, p. 339)
What does this imply for econophysics? The foundational vision of standard
economics is the individual as optimizer and price taker who invariably ends up in
simultaneous equilibrium. The behavioral hypothesis has often been criticized for
its unrealism. Although everyone could easily agree, this argument is second-best
because it does not go to the root. The crucial point is that the optimizing hypothesis
forces one to assume a production function with decreasing returns. This has to
be rejected on methodological grounds. The production function is a physical
relationship that has to be taken as empirical fact. We cannot know a priori whether
it exhibits increasing, constant, or decreasing returns. To let a behavioral hypothesis
determine a physical relationship is an elementary methodological blunder.
Such thinkers do not reflect that the idea, being a result of abstraction,
ought to conform to the facts, and cannot make the facts conform to it.
(Mill, 2006, p. 751); for Galileo’s critique of the Peripatetic school in
almost the same words see (Kline, 1982, p. 48)
It is for methodological reasons that the belief to which standard economists cling
most has to go overboard. This is consensus among econophysicists.
To be quite blunt, all existing ‘lessons’ taught in standard economics
texts should be either abandoned or tested empirically, but should never
be accepted as a basis for modelling. (McCauley, 2006, pp. 6-7)
This brings us to the question of what can be accepted as as basis for modeling.
There is no way around it, econophysics is in need of a new economic paradigm.
What is known for sure at the moment is that this paradigm cannot be based on
behavioral assumptions of any sort. Agent-based models are more realistic, this is
beyond question, but they too are built on behavioral assumptions.
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3 What is conserved?
Physicists have found out that local invariance principles are the foundations for
the discovery of mathematical laws (McCauley, 2006, p. 3). Conservation laws
which follow from invariance principles are at the heart of physics (cf. Mirowski,
1988, pp. 18-19). For an econophysicist it is therefore quite natural to look first for
a conserved entity in economics.
The budget constraint is conservation of money, and that constraint is
badly violated in the real world, where money is created and destroyed
with the tap of a computer key via credit. . . . In our era, conservation
of money is a silly assumption. (McCauley, 2006, pp. 4-5)
This seems to be the premature end of a promising idea. However, this is only due
to a lack of understanding of money’s essential properties.
To begin with, forget stories about the gold standard mechanism or the quantity of
money as a fixed stock and think of money as the liability side of a central bank
which stands at the moment for the whole banking industry (for details see 2011c).
In order to reduce the monetary phenomena to the essentials it is supposed that all
financial transactions between the household and the business sector are carried
out without costs by the central bank. The stock of money then takes the form of
current deposits or current overdrafts. Initial endowments can be set to zero. Then,
if the household sector owns current deposits as a result of the ongoing transactions
between both sectors the current overdrafts of the business sector are of equal
amount, and vice versa if the business sector owns current deposits. Money and
credit are symmetrical; the stock of money of each sector can be either positive or
negative. The quantity of money is equal to the amount of deposits and always ≥ 0.
Money in the form of current deposits is not fix and can change in any period by
a random amount. At first sight money is not conserved. However, when deposits
and overdrafts are added the result will be zero at each measurement. This is an
elementary conservation law.
Money is conserved in a second and actually more important sense (for details see
2011a). Imagine a simple consumption economy (see Section 4) with the household
sector making a small deficit in relation to total income in each consecutive period.
That is, the overdrafts of the household sector grow and, by the same amount, the
deposits of the business sector. The quantity of money grows. There is no need to
go into details like interest and collateral; this process can go on for an indefinite
time. Logic, though, cannot be content with this vague outcome. The process has to
be reversed because the overdrafts have to be redeemed before the end of time. The
logical endpoint is that the quantity of money in the form of deposits must return
to zero at some unknown date. Seen over all periods, then, the budget constraint
holds. This, too, is a conservation law, albeit a temporal indeterminate one. No
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sifting of terabytes of historical data will reveal it because the descending half of
the trajectory lies in the future.
The inviolable temporal budget constraint has a direct consequence for the ongoing
crisis. As long as the household sector (or the public sector, for that matter) expands
overdrafts the business sector as a whole will post a profit (see Section 5, eq. (10)).
This is, in the first approximation, a good thing because a market system with
overall zero profit and more than one firm is impossible (except for the Walrasians).
How this overall profit is distributed among sectors and firms can be left open
here. It is in any case obvious from (10) that an entrepreneur who demands a
reduction of the public debt has not grasped the essential point about profit. The
cumulated profit of the business sector is, in the simplest case, exactly equal to the
cumulated deficits of private and public households (in the absence of distributed
profits). Now, the logical consequence of the conservation principle is somewhat
uncomfortable. When the private and public households start to pay off their debt,
voluntarily or involuntarily, the business sector makes a loss. Seen over all periods
the conservation law demands that the sum of losses is equal to the sum of profits.
That is, over all periods the net outcome is zero (with zero distributed profits). The
conservation law makes itself felt, not in full of course, in any debt deflation. The
current economic situation in many countries provides an occasion for econophysics
to test this conservation law (for details see 2012a). The prediction for a closed
economy with no change of distributed profit is: a reduction of private and public
debt is necessarily accompanied by an exactly equal reduction of overall profit in
the period under consideration.
Some econophysics hold that it is a ‘fundamental fallacy to base economic models
on a principle of conservation’ (Gallegatti et al., 2005, p. 8). This is correct only
insofar as such a principle cannot be fetched out of thin air or simply postulated.
A theory is needed to discover it.
The moral of the story is simply this: it takes a new theory, and not just
the destructive exposure of assumptions or the collection of new facts,
to beat an old theory. (Blaug, 1998, p. 703)
4 Take three: the indispensable formal minimum
The formal foundations of theoretical economics must be nonbehavioral and epito-
mize the interdependence of real and nominal variables that constitutes the monetary
economy (for details see 2013b).
The first three axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in a period of
arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is conveniently
assumed to be the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have at first one world
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economy, one firm, and one product. Quantitative and qualitative differentiation is
obviously the next logical step.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income, i.e.
the product of wage rate W and total working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on the underlying production process. The 2nd axiom
should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function.
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P and
quantity bought X .
C = PX |t (3)
A set of axioms is a tentative formal starting point. The assessment comes on the
next stage with the interpretation of the logical implications of the formal world and
the comparison with selected data and phenomena of the real world. Axioms should
have an intuitive economic interpretation (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 2007,
p. 25). The economic meaning is rather obvious for the set of structural axioms.
What deserves mention is that total income in (1) is the sum of wage income and
distributed profit and not of wage income and profit. Profit and distributed profit
have to be thoroughly kept apart.
By choosing objective structural relationships as axioms behavioral hypotheses are
not ruled out. The structural axiom set is open to any behavioral assumption and not
restricted to the standard optimization calculus (for details see 2011b). The analysis
of behavioral interaction is, for compelling methodological reasons, moved from
the center of the domain to the periphery.
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms (Boylan and
O’Gorman, 2007, p. 431). They add no content to the set of axioms but merely
facilitate the use of symbols. New variables are introduced with new axioms. With
(4) wage income YW and distributed profit income YD is defined:
YW ≡WL YD ≡ DN |t. (4)
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With (5) the expenditure ratio ρE , the sales ratio ρX , the distributed profit ratio ρD,
and the factor cost ratio ρF is defined:
ρE ≡ CY ρX ≡
X
O
ρD ≡ YDYW ρF ≡
W
PR
|t. (5)
The axioms and definitions are consolidated to one single equation:
ρF
ρE
ρX
(1+ρD) = 1 |t. (6)
The period core (6) as absolute formal minimum determines the interdependencies
of the measurable key ratios for each period. It asserts that the product of the
constituents which characterize the firm, the market outcome, and the income
distribution is always equal to unity.
The period core is purely structural, i.e. free of any behavioral assumptions, unit-
free1 because all real and nominal dimensions cancel out, and contingent. Con-
tingency means that it is open until explicitly stated which of the variables are
independent and which is dependent. The form of (6) precludes any notion of
causality; it states that the interdependence of the key ratios is subject to a conserva-
tion law. Walras’s law is a limiting case of (6) (for details see 2013c).
The factor cost ratio ρF summarizes the internal conditions of the firm. A value of
ρF < 1 signifies that the real wage WP is lower than the productivity R or, in other
words, that unit wage costs WR are lower than the price P or, in still other words,
that the value of output per hour PR exceeds the value of input W . In this case the
profit per unit is positive. Then we have the conditions in the product market. An
expenditure ratio ρE = 1 indicates that consumption expenditures C are equal to
income Y , in other words, that the household sector’s budget is balanced. A value
of ρX = 1 of the sales ratio means that the quantities produced O and sold X are
equal in period t or, in other words, that the product market is cleared. In the special
case ρE = 1 and ρX = 1 with budget balancing and market clearing the factor cost
ratio ρF and with it the profit per unit is determined solely by the distributed profit
ratio ρD. The period core (6) covers the key ratios about the firm, the market, and
the income distribution and determines their interdependencies. The period core
represents the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment expenditures, no
foreign trade, and no taxes or any other state activity.
From (6) one gets, as the first and most significant application, for employment in
the pure consumption economy:
1 “This procedure is in accordance with the principle of objectivity requiring that the whole theory
and its interpretations have to be independent of the choice of the units of measurement. And
this requirement is met, if the theory is unit-free, the necessary condition stated in Buckingham’s
P-theorem.” (Schmiechen, 2009, p. 176)
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L =
YD
ρX
ρE
PR−W
|t. (7)
Employment L depends, with distributed profit YD given and the product market
cleared, i.e. ρX = 1, (a) on the expenditure ratio ρE which is the indicator of
effective demand, and (b), on the relation of wage rate W , price P, and productivity
R (for details see 2012b). All variables are measurable in principle. The message
for a successful full employment policy is straightforward and does not entail any
filibustering about sticky wages or rational expectations.
5 Profit
In the structural axiomatic context the business sector’s profit in period t is given
with (8) as the difference between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole
identical with consumption expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage
income YW :2
Q f i ≡C−YW |t. (8)
In explicit form, after the substitution of (3) and (4), this definition is identical with
that of the theory of the firm:
Q f i ≡ PX−WL |t. (9)
By applying the 1st axiom and the definitions (4) and (5) one arrives at:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD or Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y |t. (10)
The overall profit is positive if the expenditure ratio ρE is > 1 or the distributed
profit ratio ρD is > 0, or both. The determinants of profit look essentially different
depending on the perspective. For the firm price P, quantity X , wage rate W , and
employment L in (9) seem to be all important; under the broader perspective of
(10), which is formally equivalent, these variables play no role at all. The profit
definition provokes a cognitive dissonance between the micro and the macro view
but, of course, entails no logical contradiction.
2 Profits from changes in the value of financial and nonfinancial assets are neglected here. One
member of the latter class is the stock of products which may change with regard to quantity and
valuation price if the product market is not cleared in successive periods. This case is here excluded
by the condition ρX = 1.
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6 Toolism or theory?
Neither orthodox nor heterodox economists have a clear idea of the fundamental
economic concepts income and profit. What is known for sure from the most
elementary structural axiomatic analysis is that the conventional approaches are
logically deficient (for details see 2013a). Doing economics without a clear idea
of income and profit is pointless. It is like doing physics without a clear idea of
force and mass. Steve Keen, strong supporter of econophysics, has drawn a radical
conclusion:
The position I now favor is that economics is a pre-science, rather
like astronomy before Copernicus, Brahe and Galileo. I still hold out
hope of better behavior in the future, but given the travesties of logic
and anti-empiricism that have been committed in its name, it would
be an insult to the other sciences to give economics even a tentative
membership of that field. (Keen, 2011, p. 158)
However, econophysics has to live up to the same empirical and formal standards. If
econophysics applies a conception of profit that is different from Q f i ≡C−Y +YD
the theory is demonstrably false and therefore inapplicable to the solution of real
world economic problems. If the structural axiom set is accepted, formal consistency
implies that one cannot define profit as one sees fit. With regard to the formal
foundations of a theory it is not the case that anything goes. Since Newton economics
borrowed from physics but Toolism has not accomplished much. An amorphous
aggregate of models and terabyte-consuming simulations are no substitutes for
a comprehensive theory that exhibits both formal and material consistency. As
J. S. Mill, econophysicist at heart, put it:
Since, therefore, it is vain to hope that truth can be arrived at, either
in Political Economy or in any other department of the social science,
while we look at the facts in the concrete, clothed in all the complexity
with which nature has surrounded them, and endeavor to elicit a general
law by a process of induction from a comparison of details; there
remains no other method than the à priori one, or that of “abstract
speculation.” (Mill, 2004, p. 113-114)
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